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STuDENT NoTEs ON LEGAL ETICs
ACQUIRING INTEREST IN LITIGATION-
THE ROLE OF THE CONTINGENT FEE
INTRODUCTION
The specific problem handled in this paper is that of acquiring
interest in litigation by an attorney. As we shall see, a lawyer may
breach certain ethical standards, particularly Canon 10, when his
stake in the outcome is too great. One of the purposes of this paper
is to show when an attorney has become too interested in the liti-
gation.
The advent of the contingent fee has complicated the matter of
acquiring an interest. Much of this paper has therefore been devoted
to a discussion of the contingent fee. Beginning with the common-
law attitude and tracing the development of the contingent fee
forward to modern ideas, it is shown that the system has attracted
abuses along the way. It is pointed out that abuses of the system
of charging contingent fees inevitably involves infractions of ethical
standards.
Specific violations of Canon 10 are also shown by reviewing court
decisions and bar association opinions. As different situations are
presented, it is hoped that the reader will gain an understanding of
the requisite degree and type of interest in litigation required by
Canon 10 before an attorney should be disciplined for a violation
thereof.
I. THE CoNTNGENT FEE SYsTEm
The approval and general acceptance of the contingent fee has
brought on many problems in legal ethics. A discussion of the growth
and development of the contingent fee system, together with certain
common-law crimes relative to the contract between attorney and
client is necessary to show how ideas toward certain ethical stand-
ards in the legal profession have changed. In analyzing Canon 10,
this paper necessarily accords a full treatment to the development
of the contingent fee system. There was relatively little difficulty
with the concept embodied in Canon 10, "Acquiring Interest in Liti-
gation,"' before the contingent fee was approved, but now a rather
fine distinction is drawn.2 There is often a sharp conflict between
the bar associations and the courts, and it is therefore helpful to
'American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 10 at 9
(Acquiring Interest in Litigation) (rev. ed. 1945-1946): 'The lawyer should not
purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is con-
2 Thrunbull, Materials on the Lawyer's Professional Responsibility 166 (1957).
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examine specific decisions by each and the reasons advanced in
support. It must be remembered that the American Bar Association
Canons of Legal Ethics invariably overlap,3 and for a full under-
standing of a particular consideration, we must often show how other
Canons are affected.
Contracts for contingent fees paid attorneys were not tolerated
at all at common law.4 The traditional method of administering jus-
tice was the retaining of attorneys at prices which parties could
not afford to pay. This defective method greatly handicapped work-
men who were injured. A bad situation was created as the great
industrial expansion began about 1880, when the emphasis on busi-
ness was on production, on stepping up output and not on safety.
Since employment was so hazardous, thousands of workmen faced
long and difficult litigation requiring much expenditure for lawyers'
fees. The practice of law was directly affected by this commercial
expansion. The workman was helpless, as he was unable to procure
the services of a lawyer. There was a void in the system and the
contingent fee came in to fill this gap.5 It may be noted that the
system of charging fees depending on the success of the litigation
was the necessary result of the conditions which were allowed to exist.
Even honorable lawyers took cases on a contingent basis, and con-
ducted their cases honestly and charged as small a percentage of
the recovery as they could.
There is little doubt that if a modem contingent fee agreement
had been offered to any judge a hundred years ago, it would un-
hesitatingly have been declared illegal and of no effect. Bar associ-
ations did not sanction the arrangement without a struggle. To
uphold it courts indulged in fictions. This attitude represented a
carry-over from the common law. At common law there were three
kinds of illegal tampering with legal rights: champerty, which was
substantially the acquisition by purchase of a cause of action, together
with the attempt to enforce it; maintenance, which was the payment
of the court expenses of another to enable him to bring suit, gen-
erally with an agreement to divide the profits; and barratry, which
was the going about stirring up legal strife. All three of these
were crimes at common law and were punishable by fine or im-
prisonment.6 All three are still crimes today, although of course modi-
3aAmerican Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics (rev. ed. 1945-
1946).
4 Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 292, 61 Pac. 907 (1900).
5 Smith, Justice and the Poor, Bulletin Number 13, Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching 8586 (1919).
6 Cheatam, Cases and Materials on the Legal Profession 139 (1938).
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fled everywhere, more or less, by statutes and judicial decisions. 7
That the lay of champerty and maintenance does not prevent an
attorney at law from validly contracting to defend a suit for a money
consideration is a well-established proposition. It is usually held in
contracting to defend a suit an attorney may validly stipulate to
receive as compensation a share of the subject of the litigation."
It has been stated that the contingent fee system as a whole has
been, and is, the greatest blot on the history of the American Bar."
In actuality the contingent fee system is a practice whereby the
lawyer gambles on the outcome of the litigation. It is an investment
in a case and if the lawyer loses his investment he must recoup
out of his winnings in the next. Quite obviously it is inconsistent
with any theory that the lawyer is a minister of justice. Because he is
betting on the outcome of the case, the lawyer is an interested party.'0
However strongly we may justify it, we can not deny the truth of
the matter. As wi be subsequently noted, the contingent fee system
brought about many abuses of its own.
The contingent fee has attracted undesirable persons to become
members of the legal profession. It undoubtedly induced the "un-
holy triumvirate" of lawyer-runner-doctor conspiring to fraudulent-
ly win cases, because the stakes were high and the players were es-
sentially gamblers." Many contingent fee abuses involve the problem
of solicitation. Since most cases are taken on a contingent fee basis,
the client is likely to suffer from two tendencies. The first is the
potential for the inadequate settlement used by the attorney's mani-
fest desire to make his business as lucrative as possible.' 2 Attorneys
will often settle in preference to litigation because the gain of liti-
gation is not proportionally great enough to outweigh the added
time the attorney would have to spend if the case were litigated.
By settling out of court the attorney will therefore have more cases
and his income will be increased. The result is that his client settles
for less money than he might have otherwise attained had the case
7 A typical champerty statute is Ky. Rev. Stat. 372.060: "Any contract,
agreement, or conveyance made in consideration of services to be rendered in
the prosecution or defense, or aiding in the prosecution or defense, in or out
of court, of any suit, by any person not a party on record in the suit, whereby
the thing sued for or in controversy or any part thereof is to be taken, paid or
received for such service or assistance is void"; Millard v. Jordan, 76 Mich. 131,
42 N.V. 1085 (1889); Ratliff et al. v. Sinberg, 258 Ky. 203, 79 S.W.2d 717(1935); Craig v. Maher, 158 Ore. 40, 74 P.2d 396 (1937).8 Cases, supra note 7.
9 Smith, supra note 5 at 8586.10 Ibid.
Ibid.1- Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.J. 554, 555
(1958).
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been litigated. The second abuse is the tendency of the soliciting at-
torney to charge exhorbitant fees.13 One study has revealed that, of
the cases involving solicitation of personal injury actions, the client
received on the average slightly less than half the amount of the
damages paid by the defendant. Contingent fees in these cases
usually ranged from 40 to 50 per cent of the gross recovery.14 The
bar association committee recommends 35 per cent of net recovery
as the highest contingent fee allowable in personal injury cases.
States now not only allow, but favor such contracts. This is on
the ground that otherwise a party, without the means to employ an
attorney and pay his fee certain, and having a meritorious cause of
action or defense, would find himself powerless to protect his rights.
Modern courts have allowed the system because of its practical
value in enabling a poor man with a meritorious cause of action to
obtain competent counsel. Although contingent fee contracts have
not been outlawed by law, the courts have continued to exercise a
wary supervision over them, and contingent fees may be disallowed
as between attorney and client even in spite of contingent fee re-
tainer agreements, where the amount becomes large enough to be all
out of proportion to the value of the professional services rendered.1 5 '
The attorney will not be censured unless he accepts a fee in an amount
which has been found to be "unconscionable." 6
Any abuse of the system of charging contingent fees inevitably
involves serious breaches of certain ethical standards. Canon 10,
entitled "Acquiring Interest in Litigation," states that a lawyer may
not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting. This would technically preclude attorneys
from charging contingent fees, because the lawyer necessarily ac-
quires interest in the litigation when he has a stake in the outcome.
Lawyers are interested in the successful outcome of cases because they
affect not only their reputation, but also the amount of compensation
to be paid. However, Canon 10 must be interpreted in light of Canon
13 which reads:
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should
be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk
and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.17
1a Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 106, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 497, 160 N.E.2d 43,
48 (1959).16 Id. at 113, 160 N.E.2d at 53.
17 A.B.A. Canons, supra note 3, at 10.
[Vol. 54,
STmUNT NoTEs ON LEcAL ETHIcs
Since the lawyer is permitted by Canon 18 to contract for a con-
tingent fee, it would be ridiculous to assert that the Canons pre-
clude a lawyer from having a stake in the outcome of the litigation.
Professor Cheatham pointed out that there is an inescapable conflict
of interest between the lawyer and the client in the matter of fees.' 8
It is thus clear that in view of Canon 13, Canon 10 does not pre-
clude attorney arrangements whereby the lawyer's fee is payable
only out of the results of the litigation. For an insight into the early
attitude of the proper relationship between contingent fees and an
interest in the client's cause, a resolution by David Hoffman has
been set forth. It was intended as a guide for young lawyers. His
resolution XXIV reads as follows:
I will never be tempted by any pecuniary advantage however
great, not be persuaded by any appeal to my feelings however strong,
to purchase, in whole or in part my client's cause. Should his wants be
pressing, it will be an act of humanity to relieve them myself, if I
am able, and if I am not, then to induce others to do so. But in no case
will I permit either my benevolence or avarice, his wants or his ignor-
ance, to seduce me into any participation of his pending claim or de-
fense. Cases may arise in which it would be mutually advantageous
thus to bargain, but the experiment is too dangerous, and my rule too
sacred to admit of any exception, persuaded as I am that the relation
of client and counsel, to be preserved in absolute purity, must admit
of no such privilege, however guarded it may be by the circumstances;
and should the special case alluded to arise, better would it be that
my client should suffer, and I lose a great and honest advantage, than
that any discretion should exist in a matter so extremely liable to abuse,
and so dangerous in precedent.
And though I have thus strongly worded my resolution, I do not
thereby mean to repudiate, as wholly inadmissible the taking of con-
tingent fees-on the contrary, they are sometimes perfectly proper and
are called for by public policy, no less than by humanity. The distinc-
tion is very clear. A claim or defense may be perfectly good in law,
and in justice, and yet the expenses of litigation would be much beyond
the means of the claimant or defendant-and equally so as to counsel,
who, if not thus contingently compensated in the ratio of the risk,
might not be compensated at all. A contingent fee looks to professional
compensation only on the final result of the matter in favor of the
client. None other is offered or is attainable. The claim or defense can
never be made without such an arrangement; it is voluntarily tendered,
and necessarily accepted or rejected, before the institution of any pro-
ceedings.
It flows not from the influence of counsel over client, both parties
have the option to be off; no expenses have been incurred; no moneys
have been paid by the counsel to the client; the relation of borrower
and lender, or vendor and vendee, does not subsist between them,-
but it is an independent contract for the services of counsel to be
rendered for the contingent avails of the matter to be litigated. Were
this denied to the poor man, he could neither prosecute or be defended.
18 Cheatam, supra note 6 at 170.
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All of this differs essentially from the object of my resolution, which
is against purchasing, in whole or in part, my client's rights after the
relation of client and counsel, in respect to it, had been fully established
-after the strength of his case has become known to me-after his
total pecuniary inability is equally known-after expenses have been
incurred which he is unable to meet-after he stands to me in the
relation of a debtor and after he desires money from me in exchange
for his pending rights. With this explanation I renew my resolution
never so to purchase my client's cause, in whole or in part; but still
reserve to myself, on proper occasions and with proper guards, the
professional privilege . . . of agreeing to receive a contingent com-
pensation freely offered for services wholly to be rendered, and when
it is the only means by which the matter can either be prosecuted or
defended. Under all other circumstances, I shall regard contingent fees
as obnoxious to the present resolution.19
It must be remembered that Hoffman's ideas were espoused in an era
in which contingent fees were not commonplace.
Only under certan circumstances would we now regard Canon 10
as having been violated where compensation is paid on a contingent
basis. It would be impossible to set out a fast rule as to when a lawyer
oversteps his bounds in acquiring an interest in litigation. Because
there is such a fine distinction, and it is so difficult to determine just
where a reasonable contingent fee ends and a proprietary interest
begins, it would be profitable to examine case decisions and bar as-
sociation opinions dealing with the subject.
II. VIOLAIONS OF CANON 10
The requisite interest within the meaning of Canon 10 is not found
in a reasonable contract providing for a contingent fee. It has been
held that a contingent fee which reaches or approaches 50 per cent
of the recovery ceases to be a measure of due compensation for
professional services rendered, and makes the lawyer a partner or
proprietor in the lawsuit.20 In such a case Canon 10 would be vio-
lated and such an exaction would render the arrangement a proper
subject for investigation and possible disciplinary action.
We must distinguish between buying an interest in the litigation
as a speculation, which Canon 10 condemns, and agreeing to accept
compensation contingent upon the outcome.
Canon 10 may be applied in cases where a lawyer acquires a chose
in action, but the attorney must have been acting in his professional
capacity.21 If his action was intended merely as an investment, even
though the realization on or protection of it may involve litigation,
19 David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 761 (2d ed. 1836).2 0 Gair v. Peck, supra note 15, at 112, 160 N.E.2d at 52, 77 A.L.R.2d 390
(1959).
21 Ohio 2.
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Canon 10 should not be applied. 22 Nor should it apply where the
litigation is merely a possible incident of the purchase and not its
primary reason.23 The American Bar Association has stated that it is
improper for a lawyer to purchase choses in action for the purpose
of collecting them at a profit.24 If an attorney after the completion
of litigation accepts on account of his fee, an interest in the assets
realized by the litigation, then the Canon likewise does not apply.
This clearly differs from a case in which the lawyer speculates on the
matter in which he is employed.
Ordinarily the purchase of shares of stock in a corporation by
the lawyer is a purchase by the lawyer of an interest in the subject
matter of the litigation where the corporation is a party to the liti-
gation in which the attorney is engaged. A successful suit would
better the value of the stock to the advantage of its holders and so
the lawyer would profit from his purchase, as well as from com-
pensation for his services.2 5
A situation presented before the American Bar Association, illus-
trating a violation of Canon 10, involved speculation by a lawyer
on the outcome of the litigation in which he was employed. Cor-
poration A and the owner of a radio station filed an application
with the F.C.C. for approval of transfer of control or assignment of
license of the station to corporation A. The question presented was
whether a lawyer in view of Canon 10, can purchase or subscribe
for stock in corporation B organized for the purpose of filing a com-
peting or counter application. A supplementary question was whether
the lawyer could buy stock in the corporation or accept stock in the
corporation as payment of his fee for legal services rendered to the
corporation without violating Canon 10. The Committee held the
purchase of stock and receiving shares as violative of Canon 10,
however, the Committee did not say that under no circumstances
would it be proper for a lawyer to accept as an attorney's fee a stock
interest in a corporation client .
2
Another violation of Canon 10 occurs where a lawyer buys judg-
ment notes or other choses in action for less than their face value
with the intent of collecting them at a profit for himself.27 A similar
forbidden practice is an arrangement by an attorney with a layman
who is in the business of buying up legacies and interests in estates
22 Mich. 91.
23 ibid.
24 A.BXA. Op. 51.
25 A.B.A. Op. 246.
26 A.B.A. Op. 279. Here the lawyer was virtually made a quasi-partner in
the enterprise.27A.BA. Op. 51.
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under which the lawyer is to investigate and collect the interests,
receiving a share thereof as his compensation.28 Although the lawyer
does not advance his own funds for the purchase of the interests in-
volved, the Committee points out that he participates from the be-
ginning to the end of the transaction. This would be a devotion by
the lawyer of his training and equipment to accomplish commercial
purposes. Such a lawyer represents not only the purchaser, but also
himself, as he is a litigant for profit. The consideration in this case
is the services rendered by the attorney. Canon 10 would, a fortiori,
be violated where the lawyer buys an interest in a claim which he
represents.2 9
An attorney does not violate Canon 10 where in order to secure
his fees, it is necessary to take title to property for which he is liti-
gating. However, this title is subject to the rights of the adverse party
as finally determined by the courts.30
Another problem relating to Canon 10 and nourished by the ad-
vent of the contingent fee is the practice by attorneys of advancing
certain costs to clients pending litigation. As previously noted, this
was considered champertous and therefore evil at common law.
Before a case of champerty is made out it must be shown that a
lawyer entered into an agreement with his client to represent him
in certain litigation and agreed to pay costs and expenses of litiga-
tion himself.3 ' An attorney who does this certainly acquires an addi-
tional interest in the outcome, as he has made a greater investment
than the mere contracting for a contingent fee. Where the American
Bar Association has expressed an opinion on the matter, we note a
sharp conflict with court decisions. The courts have displayed a more
liberal attitude, whereas the A.B.A. has strictly construed Canon 10
as it relates to the problem. Canon 42 appears to specifically renounce
the practice in the following language:
A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer
shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good faith ad-
vance expenses as a matter of convenience, but subject to reimburse-
ment.32
The A.B.A. has, more or less, accepted this Canon and Canon 10
at face value, at least in the area of living costs.33 Different types
28 A.B.A. Op. 176.29 Matter of Flannery, 150 App. Div. 369, 388 (1912).
SO A.B.A. Op. 29.
31Mock v. Higgins, 3 IMI. Ap. 2d 865 (1954). The court set out the defini-
tion of champerty at 871: . . . 'a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant to divide
the land or other matter sued for, between them, if they proceed at law, where-
upon the champertee is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense.
32 A.B.A. Canons, supra note 3, at 40.
33A.B.A. Op. 288.
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of advancements have not been accorded the same treatment, and
therefore they may be broken down into several areas.
The American Bar Association's opinion toward the advance-
ment of living expenses during the period while the suit is still pend-
ing is that such advancements are unethical. An opinion was asked
on the practice of paying substantial sums of money to clients on
a regular monthly basis during the pendency of their suits. In some
cases the payments were limited to an amount covering the sub-
sistence of the plaintiff and members of his family. In others, money
was paid in larger amounts. This was justified by the fact that a
badly injured client may not be able to work for several months
following an accident and that the payments were merely advances
on account of the verdict. The Committee stated that advances to an
injured client to cover subsistence for him and his family while the
case was still pending did not constitute the advancement of ex-
penses, that "expenses" referred only to court costs, witnesses fees and
expenses resulting from the conduct of the litigation itself, and not
expenses unconnected with the litigation. It was felt that advancing
such living costs was similar to making an advance on account of
the prospective verdict and that there was no expectation of reim-
bursement except out of the verdict. A lawyer who made such ad-
vances acquired an interest in the subject matter of the litigation
he was conducting. He therefore violated Canon 10. The Committee
differed with an Illinois decision in which the court stated that ad-
vancements of living expenses by a lawyer is contemplated and
justifiable under Canon 42.34 Speaking of Professor Cheatam's re-
marks on the "inescapable conflict of interest between the attorney
and his client with regard to fees,"35 the Committee said:
[C]onflict . . .should not be extended to permit the lawyer to acquire
an additional stake in the outcome of the suit which might lead him to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client and to accept
a settlement which might take care of his own interest in the verdict
but not advance the interest of the client to the maximum degree.36
The Illinois court pointed out that such advancements to needy
clients for living expenses during the pendency of the suit was not
against public policy or ground for disbarment, and that under proper
circumstances advancements for subsistence was proper under Canon
42. In discussing cases where clients were unable to work, had no
money or property, and their only asset was the claim for damages
34 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. McCallum, 341 M1l. 578, 173
N.E. 827 (1930).
35 Cheatam, supra note 6, at 170.
36A.B.A. Op. 288.
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against the railroad, upon which respondent (attorney) had a lien,
the court said:
We know of no law which makes it more unethical, under such circum-
stances, to advance living and medical expenses to the client and so
prevent his becoming a public charge, than it would be, if the client's
only asset were a piece of real estate, to advance him, on a mortgage
thereon, money for such expenses. It is not uncommon for attorneys to
commence actions for poor people and make advances of money neces-
sary to the prosecution of the suit upon the credit of the cause. Thus
a man in indigent circumstances is enabled to obtain justice in a case
where without such aid he would be unable to enforce such a claim.3 7
Other courts have held that such an arrangement is not void per se
as against public policyas
The advancement to clients of various sums of money for funeral
expenses, medical bills, and other bills, pursuant to arrangements
agreed upon at the time of employment has been held grounds for
suspending an attorneya 9 The contracts were substantially as follows:
"We will pay 40 per cent of any recovery that we get for attorney
fee and in the event there is no recovery there shall be no costs to
us."40 Another contract used read as follows: "We will pay 50 per cent
of any settlement that we get for attorneys fees provided we get our
actual car damage and medical bills and in the event there is no
settlement there shall be no costs to us."41 The attorney contended
that the word "costs" referred only to attorneys fees, that his agree-
ment was permissible, in substance only a contingent fee contract, and
that if there was no recovery the clients would not be obligated for
attorney's fees. The court ruled while "costs" did include attorney's
fees, it was also much broader and would mean court costs, sheriff's
fees, costs of depositions, etc., and attracting business through such
negotiations is contrary to the Canons of Professional Ethics. As to
the second contract, the court felt that this was no more than buying
a client's business by agreeing in advance to pay his bills. The posi-
tion of the A.B.A. is that such advances to an injured client for
medical bills, car repair, etc., while the case is pending does not consti-
tute the advancement of expenses, the latter term referring to court
costs, witness fees and similar expenses resulting from the conduct
of the litigation itself. This would be an advancement on account
of the prospective verdict. Accordingly, an attorney who made such
advances acquired an interest in the subject matter of the litigation
37 People v. McCallum, supra note 34, at 831.38 Johnson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 315, 151 N.W. 125 (1915).
39 State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1959).
401d. at 430.
41 1.id,
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which he was conducting, in violation of Canon 10. Where the in-
jured client is unable to earn anything other courts have held such
advancements proper where they are only for the client's use.42 Cali-
fornia has condoned such practice as a matter of convenience, stating:
We are not unmindful of the fact that the contracts of employment
of petitioner as counsel, contained provisions for the disbursement by
him of such portion of the sum recovered as represented the medical
services and hospital expenses. But there is nothing improper in such
provisions. They do not include solicitation, or an unethical arrange-
ment with the Dr. or hospital. It is merely a convenient method whereby
the sums recovered are devoted to one of the purposes for which they
were recovered, an element of such recovery being medical and hos-
pital expenses. All too frequently a settlement is made or recovery is
had, and the recipient neglects to discharge these obligations .... 43
In still another situation it has been held that an attorney may
properly advance funds to his client even though they are not directly
connected with expenses of litigation.44 The lawyer advanced funds
to a solicited client to protect and enforce the rights of his unsolicited
client. The court examined the attorney's good motives in helping the
case of his unsolicited client and overlooked the additional interest
acquired by the attorney.45
Ordinary costs of litigation and even general loans would appear
to come more within the purview of Canon 42 and the word
"expenses," than would the previously discussed advancements. The
typical contingent fee contract providing for advancement of court
expenses provides for deduction of expenses advanced by attorneys
from the gross proceeds of recovery.46 It is necessary in such a
case to distinguish between retaining out of the amount recovered
any moneys advanced for expenses and supporting litigation at the
attorney's own expenses. The latter would violate Canon 10, whereas
the former would be proper. In such a case a Minnesota court said:
An agreement to loan the client funds with which to carry on the
suit or to maintain himself during its pendency is not regarded as per
se opposed to public policy. It is only when the attorneys are to ulti-
mately stand the costs, or when the client is indemnified from liability
for them in case of no recovery, that the law declares the arrange-
ment void.47
Although Canon 10 and Canon 12 would permit an attorney to
advance costs and court charges for his client, there must be an
42 Christie v. Sawyer, 44 N.H. 298 (1862); Walace v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
By. Co., 112 Iowa 565, 84 NAV. 662 (1900); Mock v. Higgins, supra note 31.
43 Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 18 Cal. 2d 816, 819, 117 P.2d 860,
863 (1941).44 In re Moore, 8 IMI. 2d 373, 134 N.E.2d 324 (1956).
45 Id. at 377, 134 N.E.2d at 328.
46 Johnson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra note 38.
47 Id. at 377, 151 N.W. at 127.
K cKY Lxw JouitVA,
understanding that the same are to be ultimately paid by the client.
If such an ethical arrangement were made and the client settled
without his attorney's knowledge and consent, then he would have
an enforceable lien against the client.48
As to advancements, it would seem that the Ethics Committee's
opinion is in conflict with the above cases at least to the extent
that it holds unethical advancements of living expenses to needy
clients where such advancement is subject to reimbursement and
made not as an inducement to employment.
Even when an attorney is required to post a cost bond, legally
obligating himself to pay in whole or in part the plaintiff's expenses,
the court has held that Canon 10 is not violated.49 This occurs
where a suit is instituted in forma pauperis and the plaintiff's at-
torney is employed under a contingent fee contract. The suit can
not be prosecuted alone on the plaintifFs oath of his poverty, but
his counsel must likewise file such an oath or give security for costs.50
The court has ruled that even if it were to assume that a con-
tract requiring the attorney to pay in whole or in part plaintiff's
expenses in carrying on the litigation was invalid, the giving of a cost
bond would not be against public policy.51 Unless the giving of a
cost bond was unlawful, the court declared that it was not unethical,
and referred specifically to Canon 10.52 The court realized the possible
consequences inherent in allowing attorneys to finance litigation,
unfettered by statutes and stated:
It would be unfortunate that a deserving plaintiff be denied opportunity
to try his case because of his attorney's refusal to furnish security or make
excusatory affidavit. But we are disposed to think that in practical
effect a much greater evil would result from opening the door to liti-
gation which may or may not prove meritorious by holding the at-
torney under a contingent fee, conditioned upon recovery, not within
the spirit of the rule invoked today.53
It is not unethical for a lawyer who has such an interest to give
such a bond when it is required by court order to prevent a dismissal
of the case.
CONCLUSION
Problems which have arisen under Canon 10 can not be attributed
solely to the contingent fee, but it has undoubtedly induced countless
technical violations of Canon 10. When an attorney has a personal
4811yan v. Penn. B. Co., 268 Ill. App. 64 (1952).
49United States v. Ross, 298 Fed. 64 (6th Cir. 1924).
50 1bid.
51 United States v. Ross, supra note 49, at 65.
521d. at 66.
581d.; Bolt v. Reynolds, 42 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ky. 1941); 33 A.L.R. 728,
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stake in the outcome, contingent upon his success, it is much more
likely that he has violated Canon 10, than if his interests were not in-
volved.
The sharp conflict between court decisions and Canons of Ethics
has presented the ultimate question of what force and effect the
Canons are to have upon lawyers. The courts differ as to the weight
to be given to the Canons. A few jurisdictions have adopted canons
as law,54 while the court of another state in citing an A.B.A. Canon,
appeared to give it at least the force of previous decisions.55 A ma-
jority of U.S. courts hold that although the Canons constitute a safe
guide for professional conduct in the cases to which they apply, the
power to discipline an attorney for impropriety is inherent in the
court before which he has been admitted and exists independently
of Statute.56
It may be quite simple to determine that a canon has been
violated, but it does not necessarily follow that an attorney should
be disciplined. A strict enforcement of Canon 10, for example, would
bring undesirable results. Courts have correctly displayed a liberal
attitude with respect to this Canon. Although a lawyer may tech-
nically violate one or more of the Canons, courts will give lip service
to the Canons and then proceed to apply their own rules of law, or
disregard the interpretations of the Canons.57 Because disbarment and
suspension proceedings are such extreme measures of discipline they
are only resorted to in cases where a lawyer has demonstrated an
attitude or course of behavior inconsistent with professional stand-
ards. Courts therefore tend to shy away from the Canons when a
breach thereof is committed. It is submitted that we should first
look at the motive and the surrounding circumstances before exam-
ining Canon 10 or any other Canon. If the attorney's motives and
conduct were warranted by the circumstances and a violation of the
Canons nevertheless exists, censure or reprimand may be the proper
punishment, but not suspension or disbarment.
Jerry P. Rhoads
M NWash. Laws ch. 126, § 15 (1921).
55 In re Morrison, 43 S. D. 185, 178 N.W. 782 (1920).
56 Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1951).
57 In re Moore, .supra note 44.
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